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ST. JOHN'S
LAW REVIEW
VOL. 5 DECEMBER, 1930 No. 1
NOTES ON THE NEW YORK RULE AGAINST
SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF
ALIENATION
ECENT proposals to repeal the New York rules against
Ithe suspension of the power of alienation and to reinstate
the common law rule against perpetuities recall the strictures
upon the New York legislation which were indulged in by
Gray. That great commentator was of the opinion that "in
no civilized country is the making of a will so delicate an
operation, and so likely to fail of success, as in New York." 1
This, according to him, was a result of the confusion inherent
in the New York statutory scheme. While "the common law
rule of perpetuities grew out of the ordinary usages of the
community,' 2 he pointed out that "the limit of two lives
fixed by the New York statute, is an arbitrary limit," I and
that "to allow future estates, and yet to confine them within
bounds so purely arbitrary, would seem to be an invitation
to litigation." 4
No one who attempts the task of commenting on the rule
against perpetuities can take lightly any dictum of Gray.
His illumination of this dark subject has been so great and
his exposition so thorough and erudite that it is with the
greatest hesitation that we subject his conclusions to critical
analysis.
On the other hand, no quantity of deference to the opin-
ions of Gray nor any sentimental attachment to the rule of
'Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities (2nd ed., 1915), p. 568.
2 Ibid. at 567.
3 Ibid.
'Ibid.
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The Duke of Norfolk's case 5 will substitute for a realistic in-
vestigation into the operation of the statutory rule in New
York as expounded by the courts. More than a century6 has
passed since these rules were first placed upon our statute
book, and if they are now to be repealed, which may, of
course, be a logical next step, the action should be taken only
in the light of the clearest and most painstaking investiga-
tion of all the facts.
Professor Gray pointed out that before the passage of
the Revised Statutes in question there was only one case be-
fore the courts in New York in which the remoteness of a
limitation was called in issue and that that case presented
"only a simple question of construction." He then listed all
the cases that have come before the courts since the Revised
Statutes and gave the following statistics:
"From the passage of the Revised Statutes down
to the publication of the first edition of this treatise in
1886 there had been over 170 reported cases on ques-
tions of remoteness. During the twenty-eight years
since 1886, there have been some 300 cases more, mak-
ing a total little short of, if not over, 470 cases. This
enormous amount of litigation is perhaps as striking
an illustration as could be found of the dangers at-
tending radical legislation." 7
It is submitted that this simple method of demonstrat-
ing the evil effects of the legislation is not significant. The
period between 1828 and 1914, which is covered by the statis-
tics, was, of course, a period of enormous growth in litigation
generally and was exactly the epoch in which New York
State grew from an agricultural community to the largest
industrial civilization in the world. It is not remarkable,
therefore, that the quantity of litigation with regard to any
one subject should have thus vastly increased. The contrary
would have been more to be wondered at. On the other hand,
a calculation of the number of cases involving suspension
'3 Ch., Cas. 1 (1681).
Laws of 1828. Rev. St., pt. 2, ch. 1, tit. 2, and Rev. St., pt. 2, ch. 4, tit. 4.
'Supra Note I at 568, sec. 750.
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since 1914 has led to the astounding result that only thirty
cases of this character have been passed upon by the court of
last resort." Several hypotheses are suggested by these new
statistics. It might be said, for example, that the statutory
rule having become fixed in judicial exposition, few difficul-
ties present themselves to the draftsmen of wills. It might
also be opined that the residents of the State had adapted
themselves to the arbitrary requirements of the New York
statutes. It would also seem that, on the whole, the purposes
of the community are being satisfactorily served, for when a
rule of law is applied without protest for more than a cen-
tury, it affords the conclusion that interests sufficiently alive
to translate their purposes into law are not belligerently
inimical to the rules as applied by the courts.
8 Matter of United States Trust Co., 216 N. Y. 639, 110 N. E. 1051 (Mem.,
1915), aff'g 168 App. Div. 903, 152 N. Y. Supp. 1147 (1st Dept., 1915), aff'g
86 Misc. 603, 148 N. Y. Supp. 762 (1914); Matter of Colgrove, 221 N. Y.
455, 117 N. E. 813 (1917); Appell v. Appell, 221 N. Y. 602, 117 N. E. 1060
(Mem., 1917), aff'g 177 App. Div. 570, 164 N. Y. Supp. 246 (1st Dept., 1917) ;
Matter of Hitchcock, 222 N. Y. 57, 118 N. E. 220 (1917); Central Trust Co.
of N. Y. v. Falck, 223 N. Y. 705, 120 N. E. 859 (Mem., 1918), aff'g 177 App.
Div. 501, 164 N. Y. Supp. 473 (1st Dept., 1917); Benedict v. Salmon, 223
N. Y. 707, 120 N. E. 858 (Mem., 1918), aff'g 177 App. Div. 385, 163 N. Y.
Supp. 846 (3rd Dept., 1917); Greene v. Fitzgerald, 223 N. Y. 718, 120 N. E.
864 (Mem., 1918), aff'g 178 App. Div. 941, 165 N. Y. Supp. 36 (3rd Dept.,
1917); Carrier v. Carrier, 226 N. Y. 114, 123 N. E. 135 (1919); Walker v.
Marcellus & 0. L. Ry. Co., 226 N. Y. 347, 123 N. E. 736 (1919); Matter of
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 226 N. Y. 691, 124 N. E. 1 (1919), inod'f'g 186 App.
Div. 722, 175 N. Y. Supp. 37 (1st Dept., 1919); Matter of Silsby, 229 N. Y.
396, 128 N. E. 212 (1920); Sherman v. Richmond Hose Co., 230 N. Y. 462, 130
N. E. 613 (1921); Matter of Kohler, 231 N. Y. 353, 132 N. E. 114 (1921);
Epstein v. Werbelovsky, 233 N. Y. 525, 135 N. E. 902 (Mem., 1922), affg 193
App. Div. 428, 184 N. Y. Supp. 330 (2nd Dept., 1920); Crehan v. Megargel,
234 N. Y. 67. 136 N. E. 296 (1922); Mount v. Mount, 234 N. Y. 568, 138
N. E. 449 (Mem., 1922), aff'g 196 App. Div. 508, 188 N. Y. Supp. 170 (1st
Dept., 1921); In re Allen's Will, 236 N. Y. 503, 142 N. E. 260 (Mem., 1923),
mod'f'g 202 App. Div. 810, 194 N. Y. Supp. 913 (2nd Dept., 1922), which
aff'd 111 Misc. 93. 181 N. Y. Supp. 398 (1920); Matter of Horner, 237 N. Y.
489, 143 N. E. 655 (1924); Matter of McGeehan, 237 N. Y. 575, 143 N. E.
748 (Mene., 1924), aff'g 200 App. Div. 739, 193 N. Y. Supp. 856 (1st Dept.,
1922) ; Matter of Trevor, 239 N. Y. 6, 145 N. E. 66 (1924) ; Matter of Buttner,
243 N. Y. 1, 152 N. E. 447 (1926) ; Matter of Chittick, 243 N. Y. 304, 153 N. E.
83 (1926); Matter of Bahrenburg, 244 N. Y. 561, 155 N. E. 897 (Mem., 1927),
aff'g 214 App. Div. 792, 210 N. Y. Supp. 824 (2nd Dept., 1925), aff'g 130 Misc.
196, 224 N. Y. Supp. 183 (1924) ; Matter of Perkins, 245 N. Y. 478, 157 N. E.
750 (1927) ; Matter of City of New York, 246 N. Y. 1, 157 N. E. 911 (1927) ;
Matter of Gallien, 247 N. Y. 195, 160 N. E. 8 (1928); Calvary Presbyterian
Church v. Putnam, 249 N. Y. 111, 162 N. H. 601 (1928); Matter of Drury,
249 N. Y. 154, 163 N. E. 133 (1928); Matter of Durand, 250 N. Y. 45. 164
N. E. 737 (1928) ; Matter of Manning, 252 N. Y. 540, 170 N. E. 135 (Mem.,
1929), aff'g 227 App. Div. 644, 235 N. Y. Supp. 835 (3rd Dept., 1929), aff'g
133 Misc. 695, 234 N. Y. Supp. 109 (1929).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
In the following pages, it is proposed to analyze, in the
light of the decisions since 1914, the practical application of
the New York rules against suspension in order to discover
whether in fact the arbitrary limit of two lives in being has
frustrated substantially the desires of the community with
regard to the creation of future estates. We are of the opin-
ion that if, on the whole, the statute has been applied satis-
factorily, it would be error to reinstate the common law rule,
with which our courts have been unfamiliar for a century,
and to expose the Bar of the State to the necessity of revising
its practice in connection with the delicate task of the draft-
ing of wills and deeds intended to provide for the posterity
of this generation.
The New York rules with regard to suspension render
invalid two separate groups of future interests. On the one
hand, we have bad trusts, the income of which is consecu-
tively payable to more than two people in being, and, on the
other hand, we have bad contingent future interests to per-.
sons unborn and whose birth might be delayed beyond two
lives in being. It -will be noted that in the first mentioned
group it is necessary that the income of the trust be payable
consecutively to more than two named persons in being, for
it is now well settled that if the income from a trust is divided
among any number of existing individuals, the trust is valid
in spite of the fact that more than two lives might pass before
it is entirely terminated. This is the result of a series of
cases, beginning with Matter of Colgrove,9 and has been lit-
erally carried out in every case in which the income from a
trust fund was divided among more than two people. The
uniformity with which the courts have held that where there
is a division of income among more than two beneficiaries the
testator intended separate trusts, suggests the conclusion
that the doctrine of intended separate trusts is in reality
a fiction devised to save certain desirable trusts from the con-
demnation of the statute. The decision of the Court of Ap-
peals in Matter of Horner'0 first gave voice to this judicial
statutory extrapolation and subsequent decisions have not
hesitated to carry out the implications of that fiction. The
Supra Note 8.lo Supra Note 8.
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doctrine thus developed by the courts has helped enormously
to overcome one of the major difficulties of the statute in that
it is now possible for a testator who has more than two de-
pendents whom he wishes to provide for to give to each an
income for life out of his estate.
The danger with legal fictions, however, is apparent here
as it is elsewhere, for since these trusts were only upheld on
the supposed presumption that separate trusts were intended
by the testator, a proportionate part of the trust must come
to an end as each beneficiary dies and it is impossible, under
that rule, for the testator to provide that the income upon
the death of one of the beneficiaries should continue to be
paid to the remaining beneficiaries, where there are more
than two. Under the common law rule, of course, it will be
perfectly possible for a testator to prevent the vesting of an
estate until all of his children have died. Under the New
York rule, the power of alienation must not be suspended for
more than the lives of two of the children and consequently
even when there are separate trusts, either real or presumed,
each trust must come to an end upon the death of two benefi-
ciaries and no more.
It will be argued that this difficulty, which is due en-
tirely to the method by which the conclusion in Matter of
Homer" was reached is an undesirable one and would by
itself justify the reieal of the New York statutes. On the
other hand, it is doubtful whether such conclusion necessar-
ily follows. The purpose both of the common law rule against
perpetuities as well as that of its statutory successor is the
fostering of the policy of the common law to forward the cir-
culation of property. Within reasonable limits, however, the
law recognizes the desirability of permitting limitations upon
the free circulation of property and the only problem which
presents itself in choosing between the Neew York rule and
the more ancient common law rule is involved in the choice
between methods of measuring the duration of time within
which the free circulation of property may be impeded by the
owners of the property. If it is said that lives in being are a
natural period of measurement, might it not be a complete
n Ibid.
6 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
answer that two lives in being if not natural are yet satisfac-
tory in practice, and if the income from a trust fund, or that
portion of a trust fund necessary to produce the income paid
to a beneficiary, must be distributed upon the death of that
beneficiary, it can only mean that from the point of view of
the law it is unsatisfactory to permit property which has
been used to pay income to two individuals during their lives
to continue to be tied up any longer. Such a conclusion does
not seem to be so unreasonable as to justify the repeal of the
statute which has been expounded by courts and applied for
more than one hundred years.
The courts have found no difficulties in sustaining these
so-called separate trusts. Beginning with Matter of Col-
grove, 12 Green v. Fitzgerald' 8 and Matter of Homer,' 4 the
Court of Appeals has handed down a series of decisions in
which individual trusts, the income of which was divided
among a number of beneficiaries, were sustained. In Matter
of McGeehan,15 the income was divided among three nephews
and a niece during their lives after a life estate to a sister of
the testatrix. In Matter of Trevor, 6 the income was to be
paid first to the widow for her life and thereafter to the four
children. In Matter of Drury,' 7 the income of the trust was
to be paid to the testator's daughter and to two grandsons;
and, finally, in Matter of Buttner, 8 the income was divided
among three named beneficiaries.
In all of the cases listed, no difficulty was encountered
in sustaining the trusts insofar as they provided for gifts of
income to named beneficiaries during their lives. On the
other hand, in several instances, the Court held invalid provi-
sions which provided for the payment of the same income
consecutively to more than two beneficiaries. 9
One class of cases presents difficulties which make the
statutory rule seem somewhat unsatisfactory. Reference is
"Supra Note 8.
'
3 Supra Note 8.
" Supra Note 8.
'Supra Note 8.16 Supra Note 8.
'Supra Note 8.
"I'Supra Note 8.
"Matter of Perkins. 245 N. Y. 478, 157 N. E. 750 (1927); Matter of
Gallien, 247 N. Y. 195, 160 N. E. 8 (1928); Matter of Durand, 250 N. Y. 45,
164 N. E. 737 (1928).
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made to cases like Carrier v. Carrier20 where the trust fund
was to be held and the income to be paid to the husband and
wife during their respective lives and, after the death of both
husband and wife, the income was to be divided into two
parts and distributed between two daughters. The Court sus-
tained the trust during the life of the husband and wife, but
held illegal the suspension of the power of alienation for any
period beyond the lives of the husband and wife. It is obvious,
of course, that if the trust were to endure after the death of
both husband and wife the income would be consecutively
payable first to one and then to the other, and finally to the
daughters, who would constitute a third life. This direct vio-
lation of the statute rendered impossible the creation of a
trust fund for the support of the husband and wife and their
two children; a form of bequest which occurs readily to
many. There can be no doubt that the case would have been
differently decided under the common law rule, and this case
affords one instance in which a reasonable disposition of
property was apparently prevented by the application of the
New York rules as interpreted by the courts.2
In the case of Mount v. Mount, 2 2 a will which attempted
to leave the income of a trust fund to a group of children,
some of whom were not yet in being, was held to be invalid.
Here we find the application of the New York statutes in
their full vigor, invalidating a gift which would have been
good at common law. But it is a case of infrequent occur-
rence and affords no real argument against the statutory
scheme. In Benedict v. Salmon, 23 a trust estate consisting of
a residence was limited to continue during the lives of eight
daughters, ostensibly to provide a home for them. It is plain
that here we had a trust with consecutive division of benefits
'Supra Note 8.
' A way out of this dilemma is afforded when an attempt is made by a
settlor to create a trust for his own life and that of another and thereafter to
divide the income among named beneficiaries. If the trust is revocable by the
settlor during his own life, the power of alienation is obviously not suspended
during his life and some leeway is thus afforded. Thus, if a husband wishes to
create a trust inter vivos to endure during his own life and that of his wife and
to have the income divided among his children thereafter the trust will be valid if
it is revocable during the life of the husband. Equitable Trust Co. v. Pratt,
117 Misc. 708, 193 N. Y. Supp. 152 (1922).
'-Supra Note 8.
'Supra Note 8.
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among more than two beneficiaries. By our canons of con-
struction it therefore properly failed. But we cannot help
feeling that here is a case in which a contrary decision would
have been more pleasant to contemplate. Perhaps a little
more freedom with the use of the fiction of separate trusts
would have pointed a way. In Matter of Perkins, 24 the Court
invalidated provisions of a will which attempted, after a
bequest of a life income to a named beneficiary, to continue
the trusts during the lives of more than one additional named
beneficiary. The case again points to one of the limitations
on the doctrine of separate trusts and the inability of the
courts to supply a felt need of testators in the face of positive
statutory prohibitions.
Since the period of remoteness at common law consists
of twenty-one years and lives in being, an estate which will
vest within twenty-one years is valid at common law.25 On
the other hand, since the New York period beyond which the
suspension of the power of alienation may not be attempted
is limited to two lives, it follows that a suspension of the
power of alienation for any fixed period, no matter how short,
will violate the rule and, indeed, the courts have so held.2 1
Whenever the duration of a trust is measured by a period of
time, the courts have not hesitated to invalidate it. The result
cannot be subject to criticism because twenty-one years is
itself an arbitrary estimate of time and there does not seem
to be any substantial reason why the courts should favor the
limitation of future interests for any fixed time. It seems
more logical to permit the creation of future estates that pre-
vent the circulation of property within the limits -fixed by
future events rather than by definite periods of time.
When we turn to the second group of cases, in which the
validity of the testamentary provision has been challenged
on the ground that future estates have been created which
are not alienable because appointed to unborn people whose
, .Supra Note 8.
' Supra Note 1 at 198, 199.
' Matter of Manning, supra Note 8. A distinction is drawn, in some cases,
between suspension of the power of alienation for a fixed period and the reten-
tion of custody by executors for a fixed period. See, generally, Matter of
Hitchcock, 222 N. Y. 57, 118 N. E. 220 (1917); Deegan v. Wade. 144 N. Y.
573. 39 N. E. 692 (1895).
SUSPENSION OF POWER OF ALIENATION
birth may not occur within the statutory period, we find that
the courts of New York have interposed but few obstacles
which were not already fully known and interposed by the
common law courts themselves. Both at common law and
under the New York statutes, a gift to unborn children of a
living child would be valid; at common law because since it
would necessarily vest within a life in being; and under the
New York statutes because the power of alienation is only
suspended during one life. Ignoring, for the moment, periods
of gestation, it was not possible to go further at common
law nor is it under the New York statutes.
That a contingent future estate must vest, if at all,
within two lives in being is the result of the decision in the
leading case of Matter of WTilcox. 7  "I am, therefore, of
opinion," wrote Chief Judge Cullen, "that for a contingent
remainder in personal property to be valid, the contingency
must be such as necessarily to occur within two lives in being
at the death of the testator." 28 The decision in that case was
subjected to scathing and pitiless criticism by eminent com-
mentators on the law of real property and, indeed, it was said
that the conclusion quoted above is "entirely obiter dictum
and only important as an expression of a great tribunal upon
important doctrines relating to future estates." 29 Indeed, if
we view the opinion of the Court in that case in the light of
more recent decisions, we cannot escape the conclusion that
a different result would in all likelihood have been reached,
were that case at the bar for present disposition. There we
had a case in which a trust was established to pay the income
to A for life and after his death to divide the income between
B and C but if B and C died before attaining the age of
twenty-one, then the principal was to go to D. Even in
Matter of Wilcox 3 0 it was conceded by the Court that the
doctrine of separate trusts might have saved the will "if it
could be assumed that the trust was several as to the share
of each issue." 31 But the doctrine of separate trusts has been
applied with like facility to trusts of personalty as to those
" 194 N. Y. 288. 87 N. E. 497 (1909).
Ibid. at 306, 87 N. E. at 503.
'Fowler, Real Property (2nd ed., 1904), p. 277.
o Supra Note 27.
Ibid. at 293, 87 N. E. at 498.
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of realty. Indeed, in the case of realty, the fiction is more
apparent. Yet in Matter of McGeehan 32 the doctrine of sep-
arate trusts was applied to a gift of realty. We have already
discussed numerous cases in which the trusts of personal
property were sustained on a parity of reasoning. It follows
that the gift to the issue in Matter of Wilcox 33 would have
been sustained if the Court had viewed the trusts as several,
and in that case the remainder would have vested within the
statutory period. The language of the Court above referred
to with reference to the vesting of estates within two lives in
being becomes, therefore, in this view of the case, entirely
unnecessary to the decision.
The authority of that case is thus signally weakened and,
there being no other support for the proposition that the
New York statutes have saved the rule against remoteness of
vesting, there remains an open question for future adjudica-
tion with regard thereto. In the light of these considera-
tions, the criticism of the decision of the Court in Matter of
Wilcox 34 assumes renewed importance and a serious doubt
arises as to whether or not the rule in that case would be
followed at the present time.
The review of the cases here attempted affords the con-
clusion that, on the whole, the purposes of testators have in
this jurisdiction been adequately served by the existing statu-
tory scheme; that while a few wills have failed which would
probably have been sustained under the common law rule, the
situation is not sufficiently serious to justify a wholesale
revision of our rules against suspension of the power of alien-
ation. No doubt a carefully planned scheme of curative legis-
lation, designed to put the fiction of separate trusts on a basis
of positive law would remove many obstacles that now make
the drafting of wills a treacherous escapade.*
MAURICE FINKELSTEIN.
St. John's College School of Law.
" Supra Note 8.
SSupra Note 27.
Ibid.
* The author acknowledges his indebtedness to Miss Rose Lader and Miss
Esther Koppelman for valuable assistance in the preparation of this paper.
